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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 20061068-CA 
ANDREW E. HOOPER, : 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES BASED UPON INDEPENDENT 
CRIMINAL CONDUCT BY ANOTHER OVER WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS 
NO CONTROL CONSTITUTES PUNISHMENT BASED UPON IRRELEVANT 
FACTORS IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS. 
Punishing the defendant for harm that is irrelevant to his offense, or for a criminal 
act he did not commit, is inherently unfair and violates due process. See Br. Applt. at 21. 
The state responds that the defendant's argument is centered upon forseeability and 
constructed from "assumption," and concludes therefrom that the issue is inadequately 
briefed. Br. Applee. at 20. The state mischaracterizes the defendant's argument, which 
is based upon fundamental concepts of relevance, statutory construction and 
constitutional imperative. 
Due process requires that a sentence be based upon "reasonably reliable and 
relevant information." State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) (citing Utah 
Const. Art. I, § 7)); accord State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, \ 8, 40 P.3d 626 ("A trial court 
abuses its discretion in sentencing when, among other things, it fails to consider all 
legally relevant factors."); State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980) (holding that 
"fundamental fairness" requires that a sentence be based only upon "accurate 
information"). 
Due process prohibits a sentence based upon a crime for which a defendant is not 
responsible. See Howell, 707 P.2d at 118 n.2; see also United States v. Hack, 403 F.3d 
997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[G]iv[ing] significant weight to an improper or irrelevant 
factor" is unreasonable); United States v. Burgos, 276 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(giving weight to a sentencing factor irrelevant to legislative guidelines constitutes abuse 
of discretion); State v. McFadden, 638 S.E.2d 633, 634 (N.C. App. 2007) ("If the record 
discloses that the court considered irrelevant and improper matters in determining the 
severity of the sentence, the presumption of regularity is overcome, and the sentence is in 
violation of the defendant's rights" (quoting State v. Boone, 239 S.E.2d 459, 465 (N.C. 
1977)). 
The premium on reliability and relevance is especially high in the sentencing 
context when "specific factual issues must be resolved." State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 
1064, 1071 (Utah 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Tryba, 2000 
UTApp230,^jl9, 8P.3d274. 
In this case, the truck driver's criminal negligence was the sole, legal and 
proximate cause of the semi-truck crash. See Br. Applt. at 5-6 (Statement of Facts, § B: 
"The Semi-Truck Crash"); id. at 20-21 (discussing the factual and legal schism between 
the defendant's offenses and the harm caused by the truck driver's criminal negligence). 
2 
The harm flowing from the semi-truck crash has no more relevance to the "gravity and 
circumstances of the [defendant's] offenses" than would drug use or a mugging occurring 
between drivers stuck in traffic backed up behind the initial accident. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (identifying factors relevant to consecutive sentences). The truck 
driver's independent superseding criminal negligence also is irrelevant to the defendant's 
"history, character, and rehabilitative needs." Id. 
The foregoing was adequately briefed in the defendant's opening brief. 
The state's argument also ignores that forseeability is indeed a recognized concept 
relevant to sentencing. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, for example, say that "in the 
case of jointly undertaken criminal activity, a defendant's base level 'shall be determined 
on the basis of. . . all reasonably forseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of 
the jointly undertaken criminal activity.'" United States v. Bustarnante, — F.3d —, 2007 
WL 2027643, *7 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Federal Sentencing Guidelines, § IB 1.3). 
However, where no reasonable fact finder could conclude the defendant actually knew a 
co-conspirator was engaged in certain conduct, that conduct was not forseeable and thus 
may not be imputed to the defendant for sentencing purposes. Id. 
In this case, the truck driver's criminally negligent inattentiveness is even more 
attenuated than a co-conspirator's activities because the driver was acting independently, 
with no knowledge of or direction from the defendant. The defendant simply had no way 
of knowing that a semi-truck driver, on a clear day on a wide open interstate highway, 
would break the law and plow into the rear of backed up traffic. If such crashes occurred 
so frequently as to be reasonably forseeable, imagine the carnage that would regularly 
3 
occur at stop signs, red lights and road construction. Pursuant to the rationale of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, it would be unjust to impose a harsher sentence based 
upon another's independent criminal conduct over which the defendant had no 
knowledge or control. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the sentencing court's unconstitutional reliance upon irrelevant 
sentencing factors, the defendant requests that his sentence be vacated, and this case 
remanded to remove from the record all reference to the irrelevant information, and to 
conduct a new sentencing hearing at which only relevant factors are considered. 
In the alternative, pursuant to the court's erroneous application of section 77-18-
l(6)(a), the defendant requests that this case be remanded to remove from the PSR all 
inaccurate and irrelevant information, and to revise the defendant's sentence should the 
court determine that revision is appropriate based upon the corrected record. 
DATED thi§/y &gy of August, 2007. 
The Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
John Pace 
Michael D. Misner 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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